Using unique data on German and Swedish outward foreign direct investment (FDI), this paper assesses international employment patterns of German and Swedish multinational enterprises (MNEs). The paper contains an analysis of what factors affect the decision to locate production in a particular country as well as an analysis of how parent employment is affected by an expansion of employment in the foreign affiliates. We find interesting differences as well as similarities between the two sets of MNEs. In particular, we find evidence of German MNEs being attracted to countries with relatively abundant supplies of skilled labor, while we do not find any evidence of this for the Swedish MNEs.
Introduction
By most measures, firms have become increasingly globalized during the last few decades. The expansion of domestic firms' foreign operations and their outsourcing of íntermediate inputs production to low-wage countries have raised concerns for labor markets in high-wage countries. According to standard theory, the foreign expansion of multinational enterprises (MNEs) may lead to a downward pressure on real wages in the home countries to the extent that it contributes to a greater degree of international specialization between relatively labor abundant and relatively labor scarce countries. However, the fact that the main part of the foreign activities of MNEs takes place in typical high-wage countries and seem to be motivated by marketseeking rather than cost-reducing motives makes it unclear to what extent FDI does contribute to a greater international specialization in this way. Moreover, whether a tendency for MNEs to slice up the value chain across countries with different relative factor endowments has a negative impact on employment in the parent country is theoretically ambiguous. It depends on whether the cost reduction associated with such a strategy allows for an overall expansion of the firm and whether the parent retains activities at home that are complements to operations abroad (for instance, downstream activities that rely on intermediate inputs from foreign affiliates). This paper uses firm-level data on German and Swedish MNEs to analyze two questions related to the impact of FDI on home country labor: (i) What factors attract and deter MNEs investment in a particular country, and (ii) what is the relationship between labor employed in different parts of the firm?
The German data (collected by Deutsche Bundesbank), cover all German companies with significant stakes in foreign companies. The data contain detailed information on location, sales, employment and capital of the foreign affiliates. These data on outward FDI and foreign employment and sales are matched to balance sheet data (also collected by Deutsche Bundesbank) on the German parent companies, reflecting sales, employment and capital in the home country. The Swedish data (collected by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)), Stockholm, cover between 75 and 85 percent of all Swedish manufacturing companies with production activities abroad. The Swedish data contain detailed information on location, sales, employment, capital, R&D investment and some information on skill shares of both Swedish parents and foreign affiliates. In principle, both datasets would allow the construction of firm-level panels. However, in this paper we use information for the latest year available for the two sets of firms; 2000 2 in the case of Germany and 1998 in the case of Sweden. 1 The paper is organized as follows. We begin with showing the overall employment trends for multinationals operating in Sweden and Germany. In the subsequent section we describe the econometric framework that we use in order to address the issue of what determines the location choice of MNEs and the issue of how employment in one part of the firm is affected by an expansion of employment in another part of the firm. We then desribe the data we use and present and discuss the results. The final section summarizes our findings.
Trends in German and Swedish outward FDI
There are a number of important differences and similarities between Germany and Sweden regarding their experiences as home and host countries of multinational firms. Germany has long been an important host country of multinationals of other countries, whereas Sweden had very little inward FDI up until the mid 1990s. Sweden, on the other hand, has a long experience as a major home country of multinationals. It has been the home of some of the largest multinationals in the world, such as Volvo, Ericsson and Electrolux. A potential explanation for this difference is that it is driven by the difference in size between the two countries -while Germany constitutes a large enough market to be attractive for market-seeking FDI, whereas the Sweden constitutes a sufficiently small market for Swedish market-seeking firms to expand abroad.
If we look at the number of people German and Swedish MNEs employ abroad, we find that the German MNEs employ about 2.5 million while Swedish MNEs employ about one million (see figure 1 and 2). When these numbers are put in relation to the number of people that German and Swedish MNEs employ at home, we find that affiliate employment is about the same as the number of employees in German parents, while it is about double the number of employees in Swedish parents. Affiliate employment has grown over time for German as well as Swedish MNEs, indicating an overall expansion of employment outside the home countries. In Germany, employment in the parent firms has increased as well, implying that there is no evidence of an overall shift away from employment in Germany within German MNEs. In Sweden, on the other hand, employment in the parent firms has decreased over time, so there does seem to have been such a shift away from employment in the home country in the Swedish case. At the same time, it is clear from figure 1 and 2 that employment in foreign-owned firms exhibit the opposite patterns in these two countries; in Germany it has decreased while in Sweden it has increased.
More recently, both Germany and Sweden has experienced a surge in outward FDI to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Both countries are located in proximity to new member country in the European Union -Germany to the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, Sweden to Estonia and Polandand both countries are high-wage countries in Europe, implying that there are potentially large cost-reductions for firms relocating their activities to CEE.
Like for most industrialized countries, a large share of recent outward FDI has been carried out in service industries. Only 19.6 percent of foreign employment is managed by German MNEs that strictly belong to the German manufacturing sector in 2000, while 45.2 of foreign employment is managed by enterprises in the German financial and business service sector (see Becker et al., 2004) . In the Swedish case, about 40 percent of all employees of foreign affiliates of Swedish MNEs are found in firms belonging to the service sector (based on the main activity of the parent) (ITPS, 2004) .
Another similarity between Sweden and Germany with respect to their experiences with outward FDI is that, for both countries, some studies have indicated a tendency for the MNEs to locate their skill-intensive rather than unskill-intensive activities abroad. In the Swedish case, this was claimed in a study by Blomström, Fors and Lipsey, 1997, but has subsequently been disputed in a study by Hansson (2004) . In a recent study by Marin (2004) based on detailed data on German firms' investment in CEE, it is claimed that there is a tendency for the most skill-intensive segments to be located in this region.
Econometric Framework
We view an MNE's location choice and its subsequent employment decision as a two-stage process. The MNE first chooses the location of its fixed assets-taking into account expected wage levels across regions. Then, it employs foreign workers to operate the fixed assets across locations, taking into account the prevailing wage levels in those locations and the demand for the firm's output. In this paper, we will analyze the determinants of these decisions in two separate analyses; one that deals with the location decision and one that deals with the employment decision taking the location decision as given.
In modeling location choice, we start from the individual FDI decisions of MNEs. These MNEs can locate in up to J countries. We follow the prior literature in that we treat the location choices as independent of one another, using a multinomial choice model for the analysis. This set-up can be thought of as relying on an implicit assumption of there being a management board that delegates the location choice to I members, who each individually picks a location for investment out of the J alternatives. While this assumption is unlikely to be strictly accurate, the set-up has clear advantages over using a binomial choice model, which would not allow us to explore how host country characteristics affect the location choice.
Multinomial choice models.
The benefit to a firm (or rather decision-maker) i (i = 1, . . . , I) of investing in country j (j = 1, . . . , J) can be described with the latent variable
where z j denotes a vector of location-specific variables and x ir stands for a vector of firm characteristics, interacted with country group indicators r (r = 1, . . . , R), that may influence the relative attractiveness of the alternatives.
In multinomial choice models the decision-maker selects one out of J mutually exclusive alternatives, picking the option that provides the highest benefit. The econometrician only observes the outcome. The probability of observing firm i choosing alternative j is
where V ij is the deterministic part of U * ij in (1). Given the deterministic parts V i1 , . . . , V iJ , the probability P ij to observe outcome j for decision-maker i depends on the distribution of the stochastic error term i1 , . . . , iJ .
The analyses in this paper will primarily be based on the conditional logit (CL) model. We have also used the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model, which extends the CL approach to allow for groups of alternatives (=nests) to be similar to each other in an unobserved way. The CL model assumes independence of the error terms ij across alternative locations j, whereas the NMNL framework allows for correlation across choices within each nest but not for correlation of alternatives in different nests. In the NMNL model, the probability that firm i invests in country j belonging to country group (region) r is P irj = P j|ir · P ir , where P j|ir is the conditional probability that firm i chooses country j, given its choice to invest in region r, and P ir is the probability that it invests in region r:
where I r ≡ ln [ P m exp(z rm β)] is the so-called inclusive value, 2 z rj is the vector of variables that differs over locations within nest r, and x ir is a vector of firm characteristics interacted with regional indicator variables r. The x ir , therefore, vary over nests but not over alternatives within each nest. In our set-up, we estimate the coefficient vectors β, γ and δ r for three regions r.
A key difference between the NMNL and CL models is that δ r 6 = 1 in the NMNL model while the CL model restricts δ r = 1 ∀r. As a consequence, the NMNL model allows for dependency of country choices within regions. Conceptually, the NMNL model is appealing, considering that countries, belonging to the same region, are similar in both their observable as well as their unobservable characteristics and may, for this reason, include correlation in the error structure within nests. In practice, however, the nested model generates very similar estimates as the unnested one and we are typically unable to reject homoskedasticity, indicating that the conditional logit may be appropriate after all.
In the CL framework we interpret our estimation results along the following lines:
1. As for the country specific variables z j , the odds ratio (i.e. relative probability ratio) of choosing a certain host country, m, versus not choosing this location is:
Based on Λ m|6 =m , we generate Relative Risk Ratios (RRR) as ratios of the calculated odds ratios, where the variable of interest is increased by η in the numerator. Using, for example, the location specific variable GDP m , calculating the Relative Risk Ratio yields:
The interpretation is straightforward: For an increase of η in GDP m , the relative probability of investing in country m versus not investing in country m changes by a factor of exp(γ GDP ×η), holding everything else constant. 3
2. The RRR with respect to the (interacted) parent specific variables, x ir , needs to be calculated relative to a reference region B. Applied to domestic sectoral wages (w iC ), multiplied with the country group indicator C, generating the RRR results in:
whereβ w iC is the estimated parameter of domestic sectoral wages (w iC ) for country group C, and b and c refer to any country belonging to region B and C, respectively. A natural interpretation of equation (6) therefore implies, that an increase in sectoral wages by η changes the odds of choosing a location in region C compared to investing in one of the countries belonging to region B by the factor exp(β w iC ×η). 4
Employment regressions
Given their long-term location choice across countries, we consider MNEs to be price takers in the labor markets of their domestic and foreign affiliates. A firm i, i = 1, ...I produces R region-specific outputs r = 1, ...R. The parent i uses s different factors s = 1, ...S in each location r. By carrying out an analysis based on a translog cost function, we are able to assess how outward FDI affects home employment. In doing this, we treat a particular type of factor employed in different locations as distinct factors and output produced at different locations as distinct outputs.
Under a common translog cost function, firm i's cost share of a particular factor s in location r is then given by
A rs,mt ln w mt (r = 1, ...R, s = 1, ...S) (7)
and irs is a normally distributed error term with zero mean.
By themselves, the signs of the A rm coefficient estimates do not immediately indicate whether labor employed in one location is a substitute for or a complement to labor employed at another location. However, we can infer Hicksian factor price elasticities η rm of labor demand responses at location r to wages at location m from coefficient estimates in (7) and mean cost shares. Following Anderson and Thursby (1986) , we infer the wage elasticities of labor demand aŝ η rm =Â rm +θ rθm θ r , m 6 = r, and
whereθ r are the regional sample means of the MNEs cost shares. If labor in r is a substitute for (complement to) labor in m, the wage elasticity η rm is positive (negative). 5 That is, if an increase in wages at location m leads to higher (lower) employment in location r, labor in m is a substitute for (complement to) labor in m. In a translog framework of production, the wage elasticities η rm and η mr are not restricted to be equal (although the cost function coefficients have to be, A rm = A mr ). Tables 6 and 7 in the appendix shows estimates for the equation system (9) with the full (and stacked) sample of MNEs that are present in some foreign locations but not necessarily in all of them.
Data
The data for Germany are part of a newly constructed dataset for outward FDI at the level of German parents and their foreign affiliates which is based on information from the direk data base at Deutsche Bundesbank (BuBa). This information is complemented with information on the parent's domestic operations from BuBa's ustan data, a balance-sheet data set that includes employment information. The basic data set includes information about affiliates for which the German parent holds at least 10 percent of the equity stock. However, in this paper we only use information on majority-owned affiliates (i.e. those for which the German parent holds more than 50 percent of the equity stock) in order to make the sample as comparable as possible to the Swedish one. Appendix B summarizes the data set and results of our string matching procedure of FDI firms to this complementary data source. We obtain balance sheet and employment information for all ustan firms and merge this information with the BuBa Outward fdi data. Not all ustan firms are present in the Outward fdi data set, as many German firms do not conduct any FDI.
The data for Sweden are part of a firm-level database on Swedish manufacturing firms with foreign production affiliates which has been constructed from a comprehensive survey carried out by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) in Stockholm The survey has been carried out about every fourth year since 1970. The most recent survey covers the year 1998. The population for the survey is defined as firms that have their domicile in Sweden, their main line of activity in the manufacturing sector, at least 50 employees (world-wide) and at least one foreign affiliate with some production activity.
We collect country-specific information from several sources. We obtain measures of GDP and GDP per capita for all countries in our sample from the IMF's International Financial Statistics series. Geographical distance between the host and home country is taken to be the greater circle distance between the host country's capital city and Berlin and Stockholm, respectively. To measure relative skill abundance, we use the share of population with completed higher education (taken from the Barro and Lee data set). We also use a measure of the relative costs of employing labor, distinguishing between five different occupational groups. We construct these data are from the Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) Database, prepared by Freeman and Oostendorp (2001) , which contains occupational wage data for 161 occupations in over 150 countries from 1983 to 1999 (the OWW data in turn are based on the ILO October Inquiry database). These normalized wages refer to average monthly wage rates for male workers. We use the 1999 data and aggregate the 161 occupations into 5 broad occupation cate-gories comparable to those used in Abowd et al. (1999) . 6 The occupational categories are as follows: O1 engineers, professionals, and managers; O2 technicians and technical white-collar workers; O3 other white-collar workers; O4 skilled blue-collar workers; and O5 unskilled blue collar workers. By definition, the skill intensity of these occupations falls with progressing number labels.
Details on the data are found in appendix A.
Location Choice
We estimate multinomial choice models, as discussed in section 3.1, using a specification of the dependent variable, indicating the presence of affiliate activity in a particular country. For both Germany and Sweden the analysis is carried out for one year; 2000 in the case of Germany and 1998 in the case of Sweden. The variable measuring presence is defined as the presence of at least one foreign affiliate in the country. A foreign affiliate is defined as a foreign firm in which the parent holds more than 50 percent of the equity stock.
We use parent-specific variables x ir , interacted with location characteristics, and location-specific variables, z j as regressors. Parent-specific variables include the parent's profits over equity, its (non-financial) fixed assets, its number of employees, its turnover, and its exports. Following Buch et al. (2004) we also include a count of the number of countries in which an MNE operates to partly control for potential unobserved parent-level effects.
The parent-specific variables are interacted with three broad country group indicators capturing countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE ), in industrialized countries (IND) and in developing countries (DEV ) (see the grouping in table 1; here Western European countries and other industrialized countries have been grouped together into industrialized countries). We choose the industrialized countries as our reference group. Financial firm figures are expressed in millions of EUR (December 1998 equivalents).
Our location-specific variables are intended to capture four aspects of the host country: the market size, the relative supply of skilled labor, the relative cost level, and the costs associated with shipping goods to and from the parent country. Market size is an important determinant for the market access motive behind horizontal FDI. Theoretically, the effects of relative skill supplies and trade costs are ambiguous (see e.g. Carr et al., 2001) . Theory predicts that a large difference in relative skill endowments between the home and host country promotes vertical FDI, while a small difference in skill endowments favors horizontal FDI. Moreover, the effects of skill endowments depend on the size of the market in the host country, since vertical FDI is most attractive when the host country is relatively abundant in unskilled labor and large in market size vis-à-vis the home country, while horizontal FDI is most attractive when the home and host countries are similar both in terms of relative skill endowments and market size. These insights call for the inclusion of interaction terms between skill endowments and market size in a regression. According to theory, high trade costs promote horizontal FDI, since they make exports from the home country costly, while low trade costs promote vertical FDI, since they make exports from the host country back to the home country cheap.
An additional factor that may affect the location choice is the relative cost level for carrying out a particular activity in a country, which can be thought of as the relative cost of employing a particular homogenous factor. Recent theory suggests that agglomeration factors may lead the costs of immobile homogenous factors to differ across location (references). MNEs may then have incentive to locate activities generating output that can be shipped at low cost to large markets in low-cost locations, thereby generating vertical FDI (Ekholm and Forslid, 2001) .
We proxy market size with a country's GDP, and trade costs with geographical distance between the capital cities of the host and home countries. We use a country's share of population with completed higher education to measure relative skill endowments. We approximate relative labor costs with the wage cost for low-skilled white-collar workers. GDP per capita is included as an additional location-specific variable. This variable may partly capture the host country's relative abundance of physical and human capital, partly its level of technology and infrastructure, and partly income effects on consumer demand. It is also a variable which is highly correlated with the quality of economic and political institutions -such as property right protection, political stability and corruption. Table 2 presents conditional logit estimates for Germany. Apart from GDP per capita all host-country specific regressors are highly significant across all specifications. In particular, GDP levels and geographical distance serve as strong predictors of FDI (at the one-percent confidence level), reflecting the importance of standard gravity variables for explaining the pattern of FDI (Brainard, 1997 , Ekholm, 1998 , Shatz, 2000 , Shatz and Venables, 2000 . Larger GDP (market size) attracts FDI, while geographical distance (trade cost) deters FDI. In specification (1), for example, a one percent increase in a country's GDP, ceteris paribus, raises the relative probability of choosing it as a location versus not investing in this country by about half a percent in a skill scarce country and about 0.8 percent in a skill abundant country. 7 An increase in a country's geographical distance by one percent, decreases the odds of starting up an affiliate by about 0.6 percent.
The Location of Foreign Affiliates of German MNEs
To assess the effect of relative skill endowments, we interact host-country endowments with an indicator of whether the host location is skill abundant or skill scarce compared to the home country. This is motivated by theories predicting, as noted before, that differences in relative skill endowments promote vertical FDI, while similarity in relative skill endowments promotes horizontal FDI. Moreover, we augment all specifications with further interactions between relative skill endowments and GDP for the two groups of countries with higher and lower endowment than Germany. The estimated coefficients for the skill levels are positive and significantly different from zero at the one and five percent level. We interpret this as evidence of skill-tracing, i.e. as evidence that German MNEs are skill-seeking in their selection of destinations, where the skill seeking motive is stronger in a relatively skill-scarce host country. As for the interaction terms between skill endowment and country size (measured by GDP), both estimates are negative and significant for all samples. This can be seen as evidence that higher 7 When computing the Relative Risk Ratio with respect to the estimated coefficient of (log) GDP, all interaction terms have to be taken into account. Calculating the RRR, as proposed in section 3, yields :
where z m,3 denotes the variable skill-scarce location and z m,4 stands for skill-abundant country, and the estimated coefficients γ 1 , γ 6 , and γ 7 refer to the variables GDP m and the interactions between skill endowment and the log of GDPm. We define skill-scarce (skillabundant) countries compared to Germany as countries with a lower (higher) percentage share of "high school attainment" than Germany (the share of "higher school attainment" in Germany is 17.5 percentage points). Looking, for example, at a skill-scarce country (z m,4 = 0) with a high school attainment rate of 15 percent (z m,3 = 15), our results for specification (1) GDP levels are associated with a smaller impact of skill endowments. This would imply that large countries with relatively low supplies of skilled labor might be as attractive as small countries that are more well endowed with skilled labor; an implication that fits nicely with theoretical predictions based on the knowledge capital model (see Markusen, 2000) . Expressing these implications in percentage shares for the locations Hungary and India, which serve as examples for relatively skill-scare countries with small and huge market sizes, respectively, one can state that a one unit increase of the skill level (i.e. an increase in the higher school attainment by one percentage point) in Hungary (India) raises the relative risk ratio of investing in Hungary (India) by about 15 (7) percent.
To capture the effects of average labor costs on the relative attractiveness of a location, we also include the overall wage level of a country. According to theory, equilibrium wages reflect the attraction of a location, so that a positive sign could be interpreted as German firms being attracted to countries with "agglomeration" and other location advantages. Conditioning on the relative availability of different kinds of labor -as measured by the previously mentioned skill variables -an increase in the overall labor costs of a country by one percent diminishes the odds of choosing a location by approximately 0.3 percent. Higher labor costs therefore tend to deter German firms from investing in a country.
All parent specific variables need to be interpreted relative to the reference group of industrialized countries. We exclude German sectoral wages in specification (1) and substitute capital intensities for employment in specification (3). According to the estimated coefficients of the variable capturing the number of countries in which a parent holds FDI, a parent active in many locations is more likely to invest in developing countries and less likely to invest in CEE compared to the reference group. Since this variable's correlation with location choice depends on the number of countries within a country group, we mainly view it as a control. The positive estimate for developing countries may simply reflect the fact that this is the country group with the largest number of countries.
The parent employment coefficient with respect to CEE countries only bears significance when German sectoral wages are excluded. A positive sign indicates that larger firms are more likely to invest in CEE compared to industrialized countries. A natural interpretation of the coefficient therefore implies, that an increase in the employment number at the parent firm by one percent rises the odds of choosing a location in CEE compared to investing in one of the countries belonging to the industrialized countries by the factor exp(0.01 × 0.138) = 1.00138 (= 0.1 percent). Results for the parameter estimates of the logarithmic profits per equity ratio (= "rate of profit") are significantly different from zero in the CEE country group and quite consistent over all specifications. A low profitability seems to increase the probability of investing in CEE compared to developed countries.
In the latter three specifications (columns 2 -4), we include the parent wage rate interacted with country group indicators. For Germany the parent wage rate is proxied by the German wage rate in the sector of the parent. The estimated coefficient of this variable interacted with the CEE indicator is positive and significant in most specifications, but (negative) and insignificant with respect to developing countries. This suggests that producing in a high-wage sector at home decreases the probability of investing in developing relative to developed countries while it increases the probability of investing in CEE compared to developed countries. The results suggest that an increase in parent sector wages by one percent increases the relative risk ratio of choosing a location in CEE compared to investing in one of the countries belonging to the developed countries by 0.1 percent. A natural interpretation of the results for this variable is that firms operating in skillintensive industries are more dependent on inputs of skilled labor in their foreign operations than firms in other sectors and that they therefore prefer to carry out investments in transition countries and industrialized countries compared to developing countries. Table 3 presents conditional logit estimates for Sweden. The variables included are similar to the ones in Table 2 . A difference is that instead of sectoral wages in the home country, we have included the average wage in the Swedish parent. Another important difference is that parent variables now refer to the entire Swedish part of the corporation; not just the actual investing firm.
The Location of Foreign Affiliates of Swedish MNEs
In general, fewer of the estimates based on the Swedish dataset turn out significant; a reflection of the fact that the Swedish dataset is much smaller. The only location-specific variables that are significant across over all specifications are the standard gravity type variables GDP and geographical distance. In specification (1), a one percent increase in a country's GDP, ceteris paribus, raises the relative probability of locating affiliate activity versus not locating affiliate activity in this country by about 0.6 percent in a skill scarce country and about 0.7 percent in a skill abundant country. 8 An increase in a country's geographical distance by one percent, decreases the odds of starting up an affiliate by about 1.3 percent.
The estimated coefficients of the host country wage have the same negative sign as in the German case, although here they are insignificant. The estimated coefficients of relative skill abundance have the opposite sign compared to the German case, although again the estimates are insignificant. Still, the latter result implies that, unlike in the German case, there is no evidence of skill-tracing by Swedish multinationals.
Most of the estimated coefficients of the parent specific variables are insignificant as well. One apparent difference compared to the results for Germany, however, is that there is a positive estimate for the profit-equity ratio with respect to CEE countries, while it was negative in the German case. It should be noted here, however, that in the Swedish case the profitequity ratio relates to the whole corporation rather than the Swedish parent. Thus, while we found that higher profitability at the German parent were associated with a decreased probability of being located in CEE compared to other regions, here we find that higher profitability at the level of the entire Swedish corporation is associated with an increased probability of being located in CEE compared to other regions. Whether this association is due to a tendency for high-profitability firms to invest in CEE or a tendency for firms investing in CEE to become high-profitability firms because of their investment in this region, we cannot really say on the basis of this analysis. Generally, the results for the parent-specific variables should be viewed as descriptive. They all relate to choice variables at the level of the firm and they are therefore endogenously determined along with location choice.
Employment Response
We now turn to the results on wage elasticities reflecting the relationship between labor employed in different parts of the firms. Since we have no information on firm-level employment by skill groups or occupations for the German data, we only consider total employment at location r. We calculate the factor share in the total wage bill of the MNE as θ i,r· = w r· L i,r· , where w r· is the employment-weighted regional average of the country-level wages and L i,r· is the parent's employment sum by region. 9 yields exp[0.01 × (0.423 + 0.01 × 26)] = 1.00685 and for a skill scarce country exp[0.01 × (0.423 + 0.015 × 11.6)] = 1.00599, using the median share of higher school attainment in the two groups of countries.
9 Since individual firms in our sample of 1,460 German parents contribute little to overall affiliate employment in a region, we consider the potential endogeneity problem
The Swedish database includes information about the wage bill for parents and affiliates, so this information is used to calculate wage shares and country-level wages.
To obtain an interpretable estimate for cross-location wage elasticities, we consider just four country groups in addition to the parent country: Central and Eastern Europe CEE, Developing countries DEV, Overseas Industrialized countries OIN, and Western Europe WEU (see table 1 in appendix C for definitions). We estimate the system of R − 1 = 4 independent labor share equations for these four regions:
omitting the parent country from the estimations on account of linear dependence (note that we have removed the index for factor since we are here only considering one factor across locations). The definition of cost shares implies that P R r=1 θ i,r· = 1, implying that the system is only identified for R − 1 independent equations.
We approximate the firm's total output by total turnover in a location. In neither of the two samples, all firms are present in all four foreign regions. Rather than estimating separate equations for firms with the same location pattern, we choose to restrict the coefficients to be equal across all groups and stack the system of observations with according region indicators (taking a value of zero for all regions in which an MNE is not present). This procedure improves efficiency and provides us with an interpretable number of elasticity estimates (tables 4 and 5; underlying labor share estimates can be found in tables 6 and 7in the appendix).
Tables 4 and 5 display the obtained elasticities from our estimations. We report standard errors from Anderson and Thursby (1986) confidence interval estimates (see appendix), which are based on the normal distribution, as well as those obtained from 200 bootstraps. Bootstrapping is undertaken since the distributional assumption of normality underlying the analytic elasticity estimates by Anderson and Thursby (1986) is rejected for our data.
The tables exhibit negative elasticities on the diagonal for the most partas they should -but there are some instances of positive (although insignificant) own-wage elasticities. The elasticities off the diagonal have mixed from using employment shares in our weighting procedure as negligible.
signs. However, for both countries, the estimated elasticities that involve the home country are all positive (i.e., the estimates in the first row and first column of the table). This indicates a general tendency for labor employed in the parent firm to be a substitute for labor employed in the foreign affiliates. This result differs somewhat from what have been found in previous studies, since typically the elasticities have been negative when considering affiliate employment in low-wage countries (see Brainard and Riker, 2001, and Konings and Murphy, 2001) . For Germany, the estimated cross-wage elasticities with respect to all regions except developing countires are significant. For Sweden, only the cross-wage elasticities with respect to other Western European countries are significant (this result is similar to what Braconier and Ekholm (2000) found based on panel data 1970 -1994) .
Focusing on CEE, German MNEs that face a one percent higher wage in their home sector increase their employment in CEE by 1.7 percent. On the other hand, a one percent wage reduction at existing affiliates in CEE only reduces German employment by about 0.04 percent. This difference in the magnitude of the response naturally has to do with the fact that the firms' employment levels are much higher in Germany than in CEE. For Sweden, the results suggest that Swedish MNEs facing a one percent higher wage in the parent firm increase their employment in other Western European countries with 0.7 percent. A one percent wage reduction at existing affiliates in Western Europe reduces employment in the Swedish parents with 0.3 percent.
Conclusion
The analysis of location choice and employment response of German and Swedish MNEs reveals interesting differences as well as similarities. Starting with the latter, in both cases the strongest predictors of location choice are host country GDP and the geographical distance from the home country; a result underlining the importance of the standard gravity type factors for explaining the pattern of FDI. For both sets of firms we find that the host country wage level is negatively associated with the probability of locating in a particular country, after having controlled for the relative endowments of skilled labor. In the analysis based on the larger German dataset, the estimated coefficient is significant, while in the analysis based on the smaller Swedish dataset, it is not. The result for Germany implies that, ceteris paribus, a relatively high wage level deters German FDI. This result is not as self evident as it might seem, since equilibrium wages are likely to partly reflect the attractiveness of the location in terms of market access, supplier access and other factors that create agglomeration economies. A possible interpretation of our results for Germany is then that German FDI tends to contribute to dispersion of economic activity rather than agglomeration.
Another similarity in terms of results for the two countries is the estimated relationship between parent and affiliate employment on the basis of wage elasticities. For both countries we find only positive estimates of the cross-wage elasticities. In the German case, most of them are significant, while, in the Swedish case, they are only significant with respect to other Western European countries. Postive wage elasticities imply that employees in parent firms and foreign affiliates are substitutes for one another. For Sweden, we thus obtain the result that the employees in the Swedish parents seem to be substitutes to employees in affiliates located in other Western European countries, while our results for the other regions are not sufficiently precise for us to determine whether the employees tend to be substitutes or complements. For Germany, however, we do find that the employees in the German parents seem to be substitutes for employees in affiliates located in all other regions except the developing world. In particular, we find that they tend to be substitutes for employees in Central and Eastern Europe; a low-wage region in which we would have expected vertical FDI to be important and therefore would have expected complementarity.
A noteworthy difference in results for the two countries is that while German MNEs, ceteris paribus, seem to be attracted to countries with relative abundant supplies of skilled labor, there is no evidence of such skill tracing for Swedish MNEs. In this sense, our results lend some support to the claims that have been made about German firms locating relatively skill-intensive activities abroad (cf. Marin, 2004 ). However, it should be emphasized that we do not have any information about the skill-composition of labor in the German MNEs, so we cannot address this question directly.
Finally, a result worth mentioning is that a high overall wage level seem to deter German FDI, controlling for the impact of relative supplies of skilled labor. We interpret this result as evidence of German FDI contributing to dispersion of manufacturing activity rather than agglomeration of such activity.
1. Raw data. The raw fdi data are available as a three-dimensional panel, indexed by (i) parent, (ii) foreign affiliate, (iii) year. Every observation in the raw data corresponds to a single "K3 questionnaire" (K3 meaning reported outward FDI from Germany). In this data set, every observation can be thought of as indexed by i, u, t, where i denotes the parent, u the affiliate, and t the year.
2. Parent-host-country aggregates. Using the raw fdi data, we derive a threedimensional panel indexed by (i) parent, (ii) host country of affiliate and (iii) year. Whenever a parent carries out multiple investments in a particular country, we aggregate these investments into one observation. We therefore interpret investments of the same parent firm in different countries as independent location decisions conducted by independently operating parts of the firm. Every observation in this data set can be thought of as indexed by i, j, t where i denotes the German parent, j denotes the host country, and t the year.
Currency conversion and deflation. We convert all economic data of foreign affiliates into euro (EUR) and deflate them so that figures are comparable across countries on a purchasing-power-related common basis. In BuBa's original direk data, all information on foreign affiliates is reported in German currency, using the exchange rate at the closing date of the foreign affiliate's balance sheet. We apply the following deflation and currency conversion method to all financial variables between 1996 and 2001. (i) We use the market exchange rate on the end-of-month day closest to an affiliate's balance sheet closing date to convert the DEM figures into local currency for every affiliate. This reverses the conversion applied to the questionnaires at the date of reporting. (ii) A deflation factor for every country deflates the foreign-currency financial figures to the December-1998 real value in local currency. (iii) For each country, the average of all end-of-month exchange rates vis-à-vis DEM between January 1996 and December 2001 is used as a proxy for the purchasing power of foreign currencies relative to the DEM. All deflated localcurrency figures are converted back to DEM using this purchasing-power proxy. The resulting deutschmark (DEM) figures are then converted into euro figures at the rate 1.95583 (the conversion factor at the inception of the euro in 1999).
We use the foreign countries' CPIs (Consumer Price Indices from the IMF's International Financial Statistics) to deflate the figures. Whenever a country's CPI is not available from IFS but the main currency used in that country is issued in some other country, we use the CPI of the currency-issuing country. The CPI deflation factors for all countries are rebased to unity at year end 1998.
B String matches and the BuBa USTAN data
We string-match companies in the BuBa ustan (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik ) data set by name to companies in the Buba fdi data set in order to obtain information on the domestic operations of German MNEs. Every firm in Germany who draws a bill of exchange in a given year is required by law to report its balance sheet to BuBa, who collects this information in its ustan data base when the bill of exchange is rediscounted. The data base is considered the most comprehensive source of balance sheet data for companies outside the financial sector in Germany, and includes companies from the financial sector. The draft of bills of exchange remains a common form of payment in Germany. However, increases in BuBa's value threshold for reporting resulted in several drops of the sample and a marked decrease in the year 2001. For the year 2000, on which we base the current paper, we successfully string match a total of 1,731 ustan firms to fdi firms. However, only 108 of those firms provide consolidated balance sheet information. For more comprehensive data on consolidated balance sheets, we plan an additional string match to data on the 400 largest publicly listed German corporations (from Hoppenstedt) for future drafts.
We extract ustan information on the balance sheet total, exports, equity (including retained profits), profits, (non-financial) fixed assets, liabilities, the number of employees, and turnover. We use the German CPI (from the IMF's International Financial Statistics) to deflate the DEM (EUR) financial figures in the ustan data set. The CPI deflation factor is rebased to unity at year end 1998. Deflation to year-end 1998 values makes financial figures comparable to the purchasing-powerparity inspired conversion method for our foreign financial figures. The end of 1998 is the mid point of our 1996-2001 data. In addition, the introduction of the euro in early 1999 makes December 1998 a natural reference date.
For robustness checks, we are interested in German MNEs who have only foreign but no domestic affiliates ('stand-alone' parents) . For this purpose, we string-match companies in the BuBa fdi data set by name and location to companies in the firm register of the association of German credit agencies Vereinigung der Vereine Creditreform, as available in its database markus. We use the information on ownership shares from markus to infer whether and how domestic firms form part of corporate trees to which BuBa Outward fdi firms belong. If no domestic affiliate is found for a BuBa Outward fdi firm, we label the fdi firm a 'stand-alone' parent. 
C Regions and country groups

D Confidence interval estimator for wage elasticities of labor demand
Given translog coefficient estimatesÂ rm , the wage elasticity estimators for labor demand arê η rm =Â rm +θ rθm θ r , m 6 = r, and
with confidence intervals in the normal-distribution case (see Anderson and Thursby, 1986) 
where z 0 is the critical value from the standard normal distribution, I the sample size,θ r and σ θr are the sample mean and sample standard deviation of θ ir ,σ 2 A,rm is the estimated standard error ofÂ rm ,
and ρ θ r ,θ m ≡ Cov(θ ir , θ im )/σ θr σ θm and ρ θ r ,θ r θ m ≡ Cov(θ ir , θ ir θ im )/σ θr σ θrθm are sample correlations. Note that ζ rm is the estimated correlation between the numerator and denominator ofη rm , conditional on zero correlation between 1+A rm /θ rθm (the Allen partial elasticity of substitution) andθ r . Standard errors in parentheses. * significance at ten, * * at five, * * * at one percent. 
